Constitutional Law-Conflicts-In Personam Jurisdiction in Missouri by Steelman, David L.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 42 
Issue 4 Fall 1977 Article 7 
Fall 1977 
Constitutional Law-Conflicts-In Personam Jurisdiction in Missouri 
David L. Steelman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David L. Steelman, Constitutional Law-Conflicts-In Personam Jurisdiction in Missouri, 42 MO. L. REV. 
(1977) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
RECENT CASES
preme Court,49 thereby indicating that this type of aid complies with the
federal standards.
It is clear that Rogers evidences a perceptible movement away from the
traditional policy of absolute separation of church and state in Missouri. It
rejects the proposition that the Missouri Constitution prohibits any pro-
gram which in some manner aids an institution with religious affiliations.
Instead, the Missouri Supreme Court properly directed its attention to the
issue of whether or not the educational function is benefitted and support-
ed. In this respect the court in Rogers accepted the reasoning of the federal
approach which recognizes that states should be permitted to provide
assistance to schools whose predominant function in higher education is to
provide students with a secular education, even though the schools have
religious functions.5" As long as the school uses the money for secular





State ex rel. Gering v. Schoenlaub'
Plaintiff Lyle sold cattle to Tige Enterprises of Gering, Nebraska, and
received in payment several checks drawn on Tige's account at the Bank of
Gering. Plaintiff deposited these checks in the American National Bank of
St. Joseph, Missouri. American National Bank in turn forwarded the
checks to the Bank of Gering for collection. Although some of the checks
were paid, some could not be paid because Tige's balance in the Bank of
Gering could not cover all the checks. The Bank of Gering held on to the
unpaid checks for six months before it sent them back to American Nation-
al and made no attempt prior to returning the checks to notify plaintiff or
American National that the checks would not be honored. Because he was
not given prompt notice that the checks would be unpaid, plaintiff was
unable to recover the cattle from Tige. Plaintiff brought suit in Missouri
against the Bank of Gering for negligently failing to notify him that the
checks were not honored. The Bank of Gering entered a special appear-
ance to challenge the jurisdiction of the court, arguing that jurisdiction in
49. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
50. Id. at 687.
1. 540 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
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Missouri would violate due process. This motion was overruled, and the
Bank of Gering petitioned for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court of
Missouri granted the writ, holding that in personam jurisdiction could not
be exercised over the Bank of Gering.
Since Missouri enacted its long-arm statute in 1967, the Missouri
courts have consistently expanded Missouri's reach over nonresidents.2
However, the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. Gering v.
Schoenlaub threatens to severely limit Missouri's long-arm jurisdiction. The
language of Gering appears to require that a nonresident defendant know
that his conduct will have consequences in Missouri before a Missouri court
can exercise jurisdiction. This is a much more restrictive standard than that
employed by most courts, which require only that a defendant could
foresee that his conduct would have consequences in the forum state.
Therefore, although the result reached in Gering does serve the best
interests of the banking industry, the reasoning in the opinion implies
needless restrictions on the jurisdiction of Missouri courts and should not
be applied in future cases. The court could have reached the same result
had it distinguished between the exercise of jurisdiction in tort and in
contract cases, and had it recognized that in contract cases, it is the agree-
ment of the parties which should be given primary emphasis in determin-
ing whether they are amenable to suit in foreign jurisdictions.
The development of the so-called long-arm statutes3 was made pos-
sible by the United States Supreme Court's 1945 decision in International
2. Prior to Gering the only Missouri case limiting Missouri's long-arm juris-
diction was Washington v. Washington, 486 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972),
where it was held that Missouri's long-arm statute could not be used in divorce
proceedings to obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident husband. The rule
in Washington was subsequently abrogated by Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.06. See generally
Keet, Rule 54 Extends the Long Arm to the Peregrine Male, 29 J. Mo. BAR 363 (1973).
3. §506.500, RSMo 1969 provides:
1. Any person or firm, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
or any corporation, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts
enumerated in this section, thereby submits such person, firm or corpora-
tion, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of
any such acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this state;
(2) The making of any contract within this state;
(3) The commission of a tortious act within this state;
(4) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated
within this state;
(5) The contracting to insure any person, property or risk located
within this state at the time of contracting.
2. Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may
be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him
is based upon this section.
See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-596 (Supp. 1971); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §
17(1)(a) (1971); IOWA CODE § 617.3 (1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.705
(1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536 (Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1969).
[Vol. 42
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1977], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/7
RECENT CASES
Shoe Co. v. Washington.4 In International Shoe the Court discarded the old
rule that due process prevents jurisdiction from being exercised over a
defendant not served with process within the forum state.5 Instead, the
Court introduced a radically new line of reasoning, holding that the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant does not violate
due process as long as there exist minimum contacts between the nonresi-
dent and the forum state, "such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 6
The thrust of International Shoe was that a state may exercise in per-
sonam jurisdiction where reasonable to do so, and the Court made no
attempt to define the limiting effect of state boundaries. In 1957, the Court
in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 7 expanded the definition of
reasonableness, upholding a California court's assertion of jurisdiction
over an insurance company which merely had mailed a single insurance
policy into the state. One year later, however, the Court found occasion, for
the first time since International Shoe, to reaffirm the relevance of state
boundaries as a factor in determining the extent of a state court's juris-
diction. In Hanson v. Denckla8 the Court emphasized that the jurisdictional
power of any particular state is still limited to some degree by its bound-
aries.
In Hanson a woman executed an inter vivos trust in Delaware, making
a Delaware trust company trustee of certain securities, reserving the in-
come for life, and providing that the remainder should be paid to whomev-
er she should appoint by inter vivos or testamentary instrument. Later,
after becoming domiciled in Florida, the settlor purported to exercise the
power of appointment. After she died, suit was filed in a Florida court to
determine the validity of the exercise of the power of appointment. The
nonresident trust company, as trustee, was made a party and served by mail
and publication. The only contact the trustee had with Florida was the
mailing of trust income and other correspondence to the settlor. The
Supreme Court held that these contacts were insufficient for a Florida
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The development and history of long-arm juris-
diction has been the subject of many excellent studies. The leading articles include
Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois,
1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI.
L. REV. 569 (1958); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 909 (1960). See also Kaplan, Expanding Permissible Bases of Jurisdiction in
Missouri: The New Long-Arm Statute, 33 Mo. L. REV. 248 (1968).
5. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer held that an in per-
sonam judgment was not valid against a nonresident defendant who had not been
served with process within the state. Mr. Justice Field writing for the Court stated
that "[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits
of the State in which it is established." Id. at 720.
6. 326 U.S. at 316.
7. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
8. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
19771
3
Steelman: Steelman:  Constitutional Law-Conflicts-In Personam Jurisdiction in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
court to assume jurisdiction over the trust company. The major factor the
Court stressed in denying jurisdiction was the absence of any act by which
the defendant "purposely avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting
activites within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws."9
Some courts have interpreted Hanson to require a conscious associa-
tion, in addition to minimum contacts.1" These decisions have required that
the defendant purposely conduct or solicit business in the forum state
before jurisdiction can be exercised. On the other hand, the requirement
of purposeful activities has been firmly rejected in other cases." In those
cases it is reasoned that, in view of the circuitous route by which many
manufactured goods enter a state, requiring a purpose on the part of a
defendant to sell its goods in the forum state would preclude jurisdiction in
a great number of product liability cases.12 There exists a vast discrepancy
in financial resources between the usual parties involved in product liability
cases. The corporate defendant generally can afford to defend suits
brought out of state, but the typical plaintiff cannot afford to sue in any
state other than that in which he is domiciled. As a result, limited juris-
diction would thwart the public policy behind products liability: to provide
damages for every party injured by negligent manufacturers. 13
Consequently, some courts have extended jurisdiction beyond the
literal language of Hanson 4 by developing the "stream of commerce"
theory. It is thought fair that a manufacturer injecting his product into the
stream of interstate commerce should be subject to suit in the state in which
the product causes injury.15 Therefore, these courts have sustained juris-
9. Id. at 253.
10. Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1966); O'Brien v.
Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963); Oliver v. American
Motors Corp., 70 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d 647 (1967).
11. Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973); Jones
Enterprises, Inc. v. Atlas Serv. Corp., 442 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1971); Coulter v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970); Williams v. Vick Chem. Co.,
279 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Iowa 1967); Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F.
Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Metal-Matic, Inc. v. 8th Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nevada, 82
Nev. 263, 415 P.2d 617 (1966).
12. See Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction over Nonresident Manufacturers in
Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1028 (1965).
13. See generally Levin, The "Long Arm" Statute and Products Liability, 4 WiL-
LAMETTE L. J. 331 (1967); Comment, Constitutionality of the Consumer Protection Long
Arm Statute, 10 GONz. L. REv. 509 (1975).
14. In Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732(1966), the court reasoned that Hanson was not meant to be literally construed in
cases involving negligence, because by definition a negligent act cannot be pur-
poseful.
15. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961) was the seminal case which first formulated the "stream of
commerce" theory:
With the increasing specialization of commercial activity and the growing
interdependence of business enterprises it is seldom that a manufacturer
[Vol. 42
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diction if the defendant could reasonably foresee that his transactions
would have consequences in the forum state. 6
The problem in applying the stream of commerce theory has been
how to define that theory's outward boundaries. The stream of commerce
theory could be limited to cases involving tangible personal injuries.
17
However, the decided trend is to allow jurisdiction based on foreseeability
in economic as well as tangible injury cases."8 In fact, it has been argued
that jurisdiction should be even broader in the case of economic injuries.
19
A more meaningful distinction can be made by analyzing the transac-
tion underlying the controversy over which a state court attempts to assert
long-arm jurisdiction. Even where applied to both economic and tangible
injuries, the stream of commerce theory has typically been limited to tort
actions. In the first place, relaxed jurisdictional limitations in tort actions
are consistent with society's judgment that tortfeasors, as wrongdoers, owe
a moral obligation to innocent parties injured by their actions. For this
reason courts are not as sensitive in providing a convenient forum for
alleged tortfeasors as they are in other cases.20 Furthermore, due process
deals directly with consumers in other states. The fact that the benefit he
derives from its laws is an indirect one, however, does not make it any the
less essential to the conduct of his business; and it is not unreasonable,
where a cause of action arises from alleged defects in his product, to say
that the use of such products in the ordinary course of commerce is
sufficient contact with this state to justify a requirement that he defend
here.
Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d 766.
16. See, e.g., Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco, 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968).
"The defendant has purposefully availed himself of the opportunity of acting there
[the forum state] if he should have reasonably foreseen that the transaction would
have consequences in that state." Id. at 382-83.
17. See, e.g., Gypsy Pipeline Co. v. Ivanhoe Petroleum Corp., 256 F. Supp.
567, 569 (D. Colo. 1966). Gypsy Pipeline involved a conspiracy to bring about the
breach of a contract, and the court held that "[n]o case has recognized the applica-
bility of the long-arm statute in a situation like the present one, that is, where what
might be described as an intangible injury takes place within the forum state. . ....
18. Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973); Floren-
do v. Pan Hemisphere Transport, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Hitt v.
Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
19. Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975) was a private
antitrust suit in which the court made the argument that, if anything, jurisdiction
should be extended even more for some economic injuries. The court reasoned
that injuries of a pecuniary nature are as foreseeable as are personal injuries.
Furthermore, "every buyer of such a 'tainted' product is injured and thus the injury
is widespread whereas injuries due to defective products are generally relatively
rare. . . ." Id. at 848.
20. The courts often confuse the issues of due process and statutory interpre-
tation. Subsequently, the relaxation of due process limitations in tort cases is
obscured by the courts' discussion of a particular statute. The opinions rarely, if
ever, explicitly express the courts' readiness to expand the boundaries of due
process in the case of a nonresident defendant alleged to have committed a tort.
However, the courts' willingness to do so is apparent from the broad interpretation
given statutes which base jurisdiction on "[tihe commission of a tortious act within
19771
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limitations that are overly restrictive impose a considerable burden on
individuals injured by the negligence of a party with far greater financial
resources.
21
In cases based on contract, however, the stream of commerce theory
should no longer be applied. Unlike tort cases, the parties in contract cases
do not fit into the roles of wrongdoer and innocent victim. A party may be
in breach of contract, but the parties have bargained on a supposedly equal
basis. Therefore, there is not as great a need to protect a plaintiff with
limited financial resources, because the parties were aware of any financial
inequality and the difficulty of bringing suit in a foreign state when they
entered into the contract. In other words, mere foreseeability should not be
allowed to sustain jurisdiction in contract cases, because the parties,
through their agreement, structure their expectations as to a forum.
If the parties have dealt with jurisdiction in the contract, their agree-
ment should be given effect as long as it is reasonable. 2 Of course, the
majority of cases do not involve such an agreement, and the court must
infer the parties' expectations from the substance of the contract. In these
cases the criteria presented in section 188 of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws are a viable jurisdictional test.2" These standards are useful
this state." See, e.g., § 506.500, RSMo 1969. For example, in Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) the
court applied Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934) to determine if a tortious
act occurred in Illinois: "The place of wrong is in the state where the last event
necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place." Section 377 of the 1934
Restatement has been superseded by § 145 of the second Restatement which lists the
place of injury as only one factor. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
145 (1971). This standard would be somewhat restrictive if used to determine in
what state a tortious act occurred. Therefore, for purposes of jurisdiction the courts
still concern themselves with the state in which the injury occurred. See, e.g., Fulton
v. Chicago R. I. & Pac. R.R., 481 F.2d 326 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1040
(1973). "Missouri case law construes the phrase 'commission of a tortious act within
this state' to include extraterritorial acts producing actionable consequences in
Missouri." Id. at 331.
21. See text accompanying notes 12 and 13 supra.
22. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); National
Equipment Rental, Ltd., v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964); Central Contracting Co.
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1971). The Bremen is concerned with the special circum-
stances present in admiralty cases, and therefore may not be direct authority for the
proposition that reasonable forum-selection clauses should always be given effect.
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Burger's reasoning is equally applicable to domestic as
well as to international transactions. But see Seilon, Inc. v. Brema S.p.A., 271 F.
Supp. 516 (N.D. Ohio 1967). For an excellent discussion of the problem of forum-
selection clauses in contractual relations, see Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem
Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REV. 300 (1970).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 188 (1971) provides five
contacts to be taken into account: the place of contracting, the place of negotiation
of the contract, the place of performance, the location of the subject matter of the
contract, and the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place
of business of the parties.
(Vol. 42
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not because they are the Restatement's approach to the choice of laws, but
because they present reliable criteria for deciding which state has the most
significant relationship to the contract.24 The parties to a contract would
usually expect to be amenable to suit within the state which is most closely
related to their agreement. Therefore, if after applying the Restatement
criterion the chosen forum has the most significant relationship to the case,
it should normally have jurisdiction.
If there is a forum with a more significant relationship, then the court
needs to extend its analysis one step further. It is inherently important that
the same substantive law govern a jural relationship wherever the litigation
takes place, but it is not always necessary to pinpoint one forum. There-
fore, even if the chosen forum does not have the most significant relation-
ship to a contract, jurisdiction might still be allowed as long as that state has
some reasonable connection with the case. The court should look to the
parties' agreement to determine if there are important reasons for insisting
on resort to another forum, and should not deny jurisdiction unless such
reasons exist.
It must be stressed that even if the courts apply different specific
criteria for determining jurisdiction in tort actions than in contract actions,
the underlying principle for all cases is the same. Jurisdiction cannot be
exercised over a nonresident unless it is reasonable and fair to do so, and
this standard cannot be applied mechanically.25 Given the ambiguities of
due process, no test can be applied without examining the specific facts of
each case.
For example, in Kerrigan v. Clarke Gravely Corp.26 the plaintiff, a
Pennsylvania resident, was injured by a snowblower attached to a tractor.
The plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer of the tractor on a
theory of strict liability and also against a New Jersey partnership which
had repaired the tractor. The partnership moved to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction over its person, and the federal judge granted the motion. The
court recognized the line of cases utilizing foreseeability as a test, and
realized that under these cases an argument could be made for holding the
partnership subject to jurisdiction as the partnership knew that plaintiffs
were Pennsylvania residents. It therefore was reasonably foreseeable that
any negligent repairs would have harmful consequences in Pennsylvania.
Nevertheless, the court stressed that the defendant partnership was a small
operation with little interstate impact, and considered that a blanket appli-
cation of the foreseeability test would produce unfair results in particular
situations.
The flexibility of the constitutional standard as exhibited in Kerrigan
also explains the Court's statement in Hanson that jurisdiction cannot
24. Id.
25. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
26. 71 F.R.D. 480 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
19771
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always be predicated on the choice of laws. Just as there will be exception-
al tort cases where the stream of commerce theory should not be applied,
there might also be contract cases where the state with the most significant
relationship to a contract could not exercise jurisdiction, for example, if the
contract were one of adhesion. This does not mean that there are not valid
guidelines available for determining jurisdiction, but simply that the Su-
preme Court decisions do not allow totally valid generalizations. 28
Although the Gering court dealt with the language of Missouri's long-
arm statute, it has been decided that the Missouri legislature's intent was to
pass a long-arm statute that would act as a functional equivalent of due
process. 29 If jurisdiction over the Bank of Gering met due process require-
ments, it should have been sustained under the Missouri statute. There-
fore, despite the court's language, Gering was decided on constitutional
grounds.
The majority in Gering realized that the Bank of Gering could have
foreseen that a customer would write checks in a nearby state and that the
failure to notify of dishonor would cause injury in that state. Under the
reasoning of cases applying the stream of commerce theory, a strong
argument could be made for sustaining jurisdiction. As a result, the court
felt that in order to deny jurisdiction in Gering it first was necessary to
distinguish past product liability cases on the ground that the defendant-
manufacturers in those cases knew their goods were to be sold in the forum
state.30 The Bank of Gering, the court said, did not purposely avail itself of
the privilege of conducting business in Missouri, since the business involv-
ing the drafts was not solicited."'
The implication of the court's language is that there must be a pur-
27. 357 U.S. at 253. "For choice-of-law purposes such a ruling may be jus-
tified, but we think it an insubstantial connection with the trust agreement for
purposes of determining the question of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant."
28. See Kurland, supra note 4, in which the writer said:
They do not reveal how each factor is to be weighed in combination with
the others. It may be that it is not possible to do so and that here as
elsewhere in our constitutional law the Supreme Court must depend on
the good faith and good judgment of the other courts in the American
judicial system.
Id. at 623.
29. In State ex rel. Deere & Co. v. Pinnell, 454 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo. En Banc
1970) the court held:
In concluding our effort to determine the legislative intent of the General
Assembly of Missouri, we are convinced that the ultimate objective was to
extend the jurisdiction of the courts of this state over nonresident defend-
ants to that extent permissible under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Of course, states are not required to extend their jurisdiction to the limits of due
process. See, e.g., Lowd v. California Fund Management Co., 235 F. Supp. 486 (D.
Mass. 1964).
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poseful exploitation of a Missouri market before a Missouri court can
exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident, and it is not sufficient that the
defendant could foresee that his actions would have consequences in Mis-
souri. Such an interpretation of due process requirements is unduly restric-
tive and would limit Missouri's jurisdiction well within the bounds held
constitutional in other states.3 Moreover, prior to Gering, Missouri courts
had never required that a nonresident manufacturer know his goods were
to be shipped into Missouri in order to exercise long-arm jurisdiction.
In State ex rel. Birdsboro Corp. v. Kimberlin,33 one of the cases distin-
guished by the Gering majority, the court's statement that the defendant
knew his goods were to be sold in Missouri was simply a parenthetical
remark made to strengthen the court's argument, not to limit its
rationale.34 In addition, in State ex rel. Deere v. Pinnell35 the Missouri Su-
preme Court cited with favor Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 6 in which the defendant did not know the ultimate destination of
his products.
Furthermore, even if past precedent did support the Gering majority's
distinction based on the knowledge of the defendant, that distinction does
not necessarily support the court's decision. As the dissent pointed out, the
Bank of Gering knew that any injury which might result from its failure to
give timely notice of dishonor would occur in Missouri. 7 The Bank of
Gering also knew that as a result of each new checking account, the bank
might be called upon to make payments to banks in other states. There-
fore, the Gering court's reasoning not only creates an undesirable prece-
dent, but is logically unsatisfactory.
The difficulties in the Gering opinion stem from the court's treatment
of the case as one based in tort. Superficially, Lyle's claim against the bank
did appear to be in tort. He alleged that the Bank of Gering breached a
statute38 and that violation of the statute was negligence per se. It must be
stressed, however, that the classification of actions as tort or contract for
purposes of jurisdiction must not be based merely on general categories.
The court must analyze the basis for the action, giving particular attention
to the role played by consent in the parties' relationship.
32. See cases cited note 11, supra.
33. 461 S.W.2d 292 (K.C. Mo. App. 1970).
34. The context of the court's statement follows:
The facts in the Gray case are at least almost identical with ours. There is
an allegation of negligent manufacture and construction in a foreign state,
sale to a foreign corporation, with the product in the course of commerce,
sold to an Illinois consumer (in our case Relator knew it was for use in
Missouri and shipped the product directly to Cameron, Missouri) and
personal service in a foreign state.
Id.at 296.
35. 454 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo. En Banc 1970).
36. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
37. 540 S.W.2d at 37. (Bardgett, J., dissenting).
38. § 400.3-508, RSMo 1969 provides: "(2) Any necessary notice must be
given by a bank before its midnight deadline. .. ."
19771
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When the facts in Gering are scrutinized closely, the contractual nature
of Lyle's claim becomes apparent. The Bank of Gering's failure to notify
American National was a breach of a duty imposed by the Bank of Gering's
consent, implied when it accepted the drafts for collection. Furthermore,
acceptance of the drafts by the Bank of Gering constituted a contract for
collection at common law,39 and it ii that contractual obligation that the
Uniform Commercial Code codified.40
The Gering court could have reached the desired result by distinguish-
ing between the bases for jurisdiction in tort and in contract cases, and
applying the standards for contract cases to the facts in Gering. The drafts
were accepted in Nebraska. The location of the subject matter, Tige's bank
account, was in Nebraska. The checks, if paid, would have been honored in
Nebraska. Under such analysis the court would not have felt constrained to
distinguish Gering from past tort cases based on the state of mind of the
defendant. In contract cases it is not important that the defendant knew his
actions would have consequences in the forum state. In fact, in contract
cases the parties will normally know where their actions will impact, and
where any injury due to a breach will occur. However, the major concern
in a case based on contract is to what extent the parties' agreement justifies
imposing upon the defendant the obligation to defend in a foreign state.4 1
Furthermore, there were important considerations that dictated that the
court not grant jurisdiction in this case. If banks were subject to long-arm
jurisdiction wherever a customer wrote a check, they might be forced to
impose inconvenient restrictions on their customers' freedom to pay their
obligations by check. In fact, to grant jurisdiction under the facts of Gering
might well be a violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution.42
By distinguishing Gering from product liability cases based on the
cause of action involved, the Gering court could have reached the same
result without severely limiting Missouri's long-arm jurisdiction. The Mis-
souri Supreme Court's decision not to subject banks to jurisdiction wherev-
er their customers might write checks was wise. Nevertheless, the court's
requirement of a purpose and intent to conduct activities in Missouri
before jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant can be exercised could
prove troublesome if extended beyond the facts in Gering. Such a strict
interpretation of Hanson v. Denckla would unnecessarily restrict the rights
of Missouri citizens to file suit in their home state.
DAVID L. STEELMAN
39. See 2 PATON'S DIGEST § 1:6 (1942). This section cites cases to the effect
that a bank may refuse to handle an item sent to it for collection, but once the bank's
conduct is consistent with having accepted the items, a contract for collection is
implied. See, e.g., Collier v. Municipal Acceptance Corp., 227 Ala. 37, 148 So. 743(1933); Jacobs v. Mohnton Trust Co., 299 Pa. 527, 149 A. 887 (1930); 9 C.J.S. Banks
and Banking §216 (1938).
40. 540 S.W.2d at 37. (Bardgett, J., dissenting).
41. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
42. For a discussion of the commerce clause as a limitation on in personamjurisdiction over nonresidents, see Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction,
73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 983-87 (1960).
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